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Political Development in 20th-Century
Taiwan: State-Building, Regime
Transformation and the Construction of
National Identity*
Yun-han Chu and Jih-wen Lin
In the 20th century, Taiwan has experienced two cycles of regime
evolution, during which the Japanese colonial regime and the Nationalist
e´migre´ regime consecutively dominated its political history each for
about half a century.1 The two regimes, each wrestling with the challenge
of subordinating the native society to its authoritarian rule, vision of
nation-building and state-building agenda, travelled a comparable trajec-
tory of institutional adjustment and adaptation. Each had shifted its heavy
reliance on extensive use of coercive measures during the installation
stage to selective co-optation, and to limited electoral opening as the
incumbent elite tried to consolidate and partially institutionalize its rule.
Both met with strong societal resistance as they tried to suppress the
indigenous cultural identity and impose a cultural unity between the ruler
and the ruled through state-sponsored cultural programmes. Both were
initially highly autonomous and insulated from the native society, but
over time the interests of the state elite became more enmeshed with the
native elite, who turned out to be the indispensable intermediary for
effective social control. Both regimes, at the zenith of their rule, exhibited
exceptional effectiveness in organizing popular compliance and al-
legiance, controlling and mobilizing the society, and regulating political
participation, elite recruitment and access to the policy-making process.
Both fundamentally transformed Taiwanese society through state-
building and state-sponsored modernization projects. For that reason,
both regimes were also substantially transformed by the very society they
governed as the incumbent elite came to encounter a steadily more
politicized society and a more resourceful as well as diversified native
elite. Thus, the state’s transformative capacity in socio-economic modern-
ization was both an important source of the regimes’ legitimacy and their
eventual undoing.
The two cycles of regime evolution, despite their comparability, pro-
duced substantially different outcomes in terms of the development of
* We thank Lung-chih Chang, Tun-jen Cheng, Louis Edmond, Steve Goldstein, Joseph
Wu and Rwei-ren Wu for their helpful comments and suggestions for revisions.
1. For our analysis, a political regime is defined as an ensemble of patterns that determines
the methods of access to the principal public offices; the characteristics of the actors admitted
to or excluded from such access; the strategies that actors may use to gain access; and the
rules that are followed in the making of publicly binding decisions. See Philippe C. Schmitter
and Terry Lynn Karl, “What democracy is … and is not,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 2, No.
3 (1991).
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political society2 and the construction of collective identity. Towards the
end of colonial rule, the aspiration of the native Taiwanese for a limited
home rule was only partially fulfilled. Under the KMT rule, in contrast,
a “national political system” gradually took root in Taiwanese society and
the citizenship was redefined in full accordance with the state’s de facto
territoriality. At the close of colonial rule, there was no tangible social
support for a political struggle for national sovereignty and Taiwan had
not yet emerged as a self-contained political community with a distinctive
political identity. In stark contrast, with the demise of KMT authoritarian
rule came a vibrant Taiwanese nationalist movement with growing and
broad-based social support. The popular aspiration for an independent
Taiwan became increasingly crystallized and cohesive at the close of the
20th century. Most significantly, with the indigenization of the KMT
power structure, the state was eventually converted from a cultural agent
of Chinese nationalism into an incubator of a “re-imaged community”
based on a new Taiwanese identity.3
This article sets out to analyse the transformation of the two e´migre´
regimes and the formation of Taiwanese identity – the two developments
that principally defined the political experiences of the Taiwanese people
in the 20th century – and their mutual influences. The two cycles of
regime evolution are considered in terms of the initial historical condi-
tions for their installment, the strategies that the incumbent elite em-
ployed to consolidate and partially institutionalize its rule, and the
political processes as well as the changing structural conditions that led
to their eventual transformation. The article explains why the two regimes
employed a different mixture of political co-optation (versus sup-
pression), social integration (versus segregation) and economic inclusion
(versus exclusion) at various stages of their rule in terms of the constrain-
ing and enabling structural conditions, the nature and level of threats to
their political security, and their state-building and nation-building
agenda. In acting, they made mistakes and generated unintended conse-
quences, in some instances changing their very identity below the level of
consciousness.
For each political cycle, special attention is paid to how different
aspects of Taiwan’s state-building process constrained the historical path
of both regime transformation and the development of new political
identities. The article investigates how the state politicized society by
tightening state–society relations and by caging its subject on to a
“national political terrain.”4 In particular, the growing dependence of
2. Political society refers to the arena in which a political community specifically arranges
itself for political contest to gain control over public power and state apparatus. On the concept
of political society in a democratic setting, see Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of
Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Com-
munist Europe (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), ch. 2.
3. The expression “imagined community” is adopted from Benedict Anderson, Imagined
Communities, revised edition (Verso, 1991).
4. For the notion of “social caging,” see Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power:
Volume II, The Rise of Classes and Nation-State, 1760–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), p. 61.
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society on the state for its capacity to provide a co-ordinating framework,
regulatory regimes and supportive infrastructures for the emerging capi-
talist economy made the latter a growing object of political contention as
more local social groups and classes tried to shape state actions to suit
their own interests. Next, it examines how the colonial boundaries,
socio-economic segregation and hierarchical political order provided the
key conditions for the formation of modern ethnic and national identity,
and how the modern state, which possessed the most encompassing
material and symbolic infrastructure for the construction of a social and
cultural entity more homogeneous internally and more distinctive exter-
nally, became instrumental in the development of full-blown national
identity.5
Taiwan’s unique history of modern state-building also prompts an
investigation of how the process of indigenization and consolidation of a
“transplanted state” influenced regime evolution and the development of
new political identities. The twin processes provide the necessary condi-
tions for a dependent, subordinate and non-sovereign political unit to
evolve into an independent and self-contained sovereign entity with a
distinctive national identity.
The article examines the bargaining and mutual accommodation be-
tween the local and incumbent elites within the broader context of
state-building and changing state–society relations. It identifies the forces
behind the formation of new political identities, which were shaped by
the inherited pre-modern myths, memories and symbols, deliberate
projects pursued by political elites, and the unintended consequences of
the state-building process. The incumbent state elite designed and pur-
sued their state-building project in accordance with their knowledge and
vision of state-building, on the basis of the existing state apparatus they
inherited, and in response to the need for controlling their domestic
political environment and to the security and economic imperative
imposed by the larger international context.
The Evolution of the Japanese Colonial Regime (1895–1945)
In 1885 the Qing government declared Taiwan a province and ap-
pointed Liu Mingchuan its first provincial governor (xunfu). Liu was
assigned a difficult mission: to modernize the island and make it a
blockhouse against foreign incursion of China. However, Taiwan, as a
frontier settlement for poor Chinese immigrants, had been tossed aside by
Chinese governments for centuries.6 For much of the Qing period, the
island was governed by absentee Mandarins based primarily in Fujian,
5. For the view that the establishment of national identity should be understood as an
explicit political project pursued by elites, see Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
6. For an analysis of how Taiwan was incorporated into the Chinese empires, see Edwin
A. Winckler, “Mass political incorporation, 1500–2000,” in Edwin A. Winckler and Susan
Greenhalgh (eds.), Contending Approaches to the Political Economy of Taiwan (New York:
M.E. Sharpe, 1983).
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who spent little time on the island and regarded Taiwan as a chaotic and
plague-ridden periphery.
Thus depreciated, Taiwan was ceded to Japan through the Treaty of
Shimonoseki in April 1895 after the Sino-Japanese war. The Japanese
took over Liu’s truncated business of modernization, but within a very
different political framework. The challenge faced by the Japanese was
twofold. On the one hand, armed resistance must be crushed for the
colonial government to be installable.7 On the other, incorporating some
2.5 million Chinese immigrants politically, economically and culturally
into the emerging Japanese imperium remained a daunting task. Opinions
varied over how the new colony should be managed.
To many of Japan’s colonial theorists, who were conversant with
Western colonial thoughts and experiences, the colonized people be-
longed to an inferior race and should be acculturated through guidance.
The colony was separate from the homeland, and should not be governed
as its prolongation.8 However, the Western model does not fit into Japan
and Taiwan nicely. Geographical proximity and racial affinity between
the Japanese and the residents of Taiwan allowed the colonial rulers to
chain the new colony closely to the homeland, implying a more equal
treatment of the colonized people.
This dilemma was reflected in a report presented by Hara Takashi, an
under-secretary of the Foreign Ministry, to the Bureau of Taiwan Affairs
in 1896. He outlined two alternatives of colonial policy, assimilation or
non-assimilation, and asserted the first one. Under his “principle of
homeland extensionism” (naichi encho¯ shugi), the Taiwanese should be
treated equally as Japanese. This policy, though not officially denied,
turned out to be impractical. The occupation of Taiwan was dominated by
political and military considerations, under which the Taiwanese were
treated as potential challengers rather than as equal citizens. In addition,
the Japanese did not find Taiwan’s climatic and sanitarian environments
favourable to large-scale emigration. With a handful of colonizers cluster-
ing in the cities, the assimilation policy was simply unrealistic.
The colonizers were thus left with only one viable option: to build
an elite-steered colonial state that was penetrative and efficient. It is
generally agreed that the major architect of this scheme was Goto¯
Shinpei, the civil administrator (minsei cho¯kan) of Kodama Gentaro¯ who
was the fourth Taiwan governor-general (so¯toku) in 1898. A German-
trained medical doctor, Goto¯ was keenly aware of the racial difference
between the Taiwanese and the Japanese, and adopted the “biological
principle” to guide colonial rule. This premise was that the Taiwanese are
biologically distinguishable from the Japanese, and must be governed
7. With the withdraw of the Qing officialdom, the remaining officials waged their feeble
resistance by declaring the founding of the Taiwan Republic (Taiwan minzhu guo) in May
1895, which was the first modern republic in Asia, but lasted for less than five months.
Nevertheless, armed revolt continued for another two decades.
8. For more detailed analysis, see Mark R. Peattie, “Japanese attitudes toward colonialism,
1895–1945,” in Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (eds.), The Japanese Colonial Empire,
1895–1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 80–127.
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according to local conditions. Under this policy, extensive surveys were
conducted between 1898 and 1903 on Taiwan’s geography, land, tra-
ditional customs and population. These investigations helped the colonial
government to usurp unclaimed properties, reassign land ownership,
implement tax reform, monopolize key industries and reach financial
independence.9
Taiwan’s regime structure was transformed under the same principle.
Basically, the colonial government kept Taiwan’s social structure intact,10
but subjected it to close surveillance. With an extensively built police
network that was fused with the traditional baojia system, the govern-
ment infiltrated every corner of Taiwanese society,11 while itself remain-
ing well protected and imperious. Based on Law No. 63 (adopted by the
Imperial Diet in 1896), the Taiwan governor-general can issue law-like
decrees and remain unchecked by any other institution.12
As the biological principle triumphed, a conundrum arose. Although
discriminated against by the Japanese government, the Taiwanese lived
under Japan’s jurisdiction and must have an identity in the Japanese
imperium. In accordance with the Treaty of Shimonoseki (Article 5),
Taiwanese residents were allowed to choose nationality in the first two
years of occupation. Only a few thousand left for China, and the
remainder became Japanese subjects. Even so, the Taiwanese far from
enjoyed complete Japanese citizenship. They were excluded from the
government and representative bodies, did not even hold partial suffrage,
were vulnerable to police abuse, and had no right to serve in the
military.13
It was the First World War that compelled Japan to re-examine its
colonial policies. In the Japanese homeland, the moribund oligarchic
system finally gave way to the parliamentary parties, a transition that
9. As a result, the Taiwan colonial government became the richest property-owner on the
island. By the end of Japan’s colonial rule, 66.8% of Taiwan’s land was state-owned. See
Taiwan so¯tokufu, Taiwan to¯ji Gaiyo¯ (Summary of the Governance in Taiwan) (Taipei: Taiwan
so¯tokufu, 1945), p. 501.
10. The Taiwan colonial government not only preserved the literati-gentry class, but also
sponsored meetings for Chinese poem composition, and conferred a “gentleman’s badge” to
collaborators.
11. In 1905, there were 4,817 police officers in Taiwan, each taking charge of an average
of 617 native Taiwanese. In 1905 the total number of public servants was only 13,207. See
Taiwan so¯tokufu, To¯keisho (Statistical Books) of each year, complied by the Xingzheng
zhangguan gongshu (Office of the Administrator-General) in Taiwansheng wushiyinianlai
tongji tiyao (Statistical Summary of the Taiwan Province in the Past 51 Years) (Taipei:
Xingzheng zhangguan gongshu, 1946), pp. 352, 1321. This density was higher than those in
other Japanese colonies. For the police system in colonial Taiwan, see Ching-chih Chen,
“Police and community control systems in the empire,” in Myers and Peattie, The Japanese
Colonial Empire, pp. 213–239.
12. Although the governor-general’s decree must be approved by the advisory council
(hyo¯gikai), the procedure is mainly ritualistic because the governor-general appointed the
council members. For the evolution of Taiwan’s legal system in the Japanese colonial period,
see Wang Tay-sheng, Taiwan falushi de jianli (The Establishment of Taiwanese Legal
History) (Taipei: Sanmin chubanshe, 1997), pp. 183–230.
13. In 1905, only 0.28% of the native Taiwanese served in the government, in contrast
to 17.4% of the Japanese. See Xingzheng zhangguan gongshu, Statistical Summary,
p. 134.
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created both competition and chaos. Economically, Japan experienced a
temporary boom when the Europeans withdrew from their Asian colonies
during the war. Economic expansion boosted Japanese demand for rice,
for which Taiwan was the major supplier, and helped incubate a commer-
cialized landholding class in Taiwan. In keeping with their rising econ-
omic status, the landed class wanted more political autonomy and
launched various political movements. This time they were armed with
modern ideologies, such as democracy and self-determination, that the
colonial government could not easily counteract with violence.
In the meantime, Taiwan had become much more accommodating
to the Japanese than two decades earlier, and Japanese was no longer
a foreign language to Taiwan’s educated class.14 Armed resistance
was totally eradicated, and Japan’s international status was affirmed by
its participation in the war. By September 1918, with Hara Takashi
now Japanese prime minister, a major transformation of colonial policy
was on the way. In March 1921, the Hara cabinet proposed the “Law
concerning the ordinances to be enforced in Taiwan” (usually called
Law No. 3) to replace Law No. 31.15 With this, the laws of the Japanese
homeland were in principle to be enforced in Taiwan, under the con-
dition that the Taiwan governor-general’s law-making power was to be
recognized.16
Institutionally, the structures of local government and the Taiwan
government were both renovated. Since 1919, the office of the Taiwan
governor-general was no longer assumed by military officers. Other
institutional changes deprived the civil governor-generals of the omnipo-
tence enjoyed by their predecessors. First, the military power of the
Taiwan colonial government was redirected to the Taiwan army comman-
der. Since the governor-general and the army commander had different
homeland supervisors and career interests, a potential conflict loomed,
and actually broke out in wartime.17 Secondly, the governor-general must
accept interrogations of the Diet members, and share his power with the
chief administrator. Thirdly and most importantly, as a backbencher in
the cabinet, the governor-general was fettered by Japan’s chaotic dom-
14. In 1920, the percentage of Japanese in Taiwan was almost triple that in 1905, while
the number of Japanese working for the colonial government declined sharply. Ibid.
p. 136.
15. Law No. 31 replaced the previous law in 1907, the only difference being that the
governor-general’s decrees could no longer violate Japanese laws.
16. Incidentally, Law No. 3 was almost identical to the law plan that Hara once proposed
based on assimilation policy. For the relationship between Hara Takashi and Japan’s colonial
policy-making, see Haruyama Meitetsu, “Kindai nihon no shokuminchi to¯ji to hara takashi”
(“Modern Japanese colonial rule and Hara Takashi”), in Haruyama Meitetsu and
Wakabayashi Masahiro (eds.), Nihon shokuminchi shugi no seijiteki tenkai (1895–1934) (The
Political Development of Japan’s Colonialism, 1895–1934) (Tokyo: Ajia seikei gakkai,
1980), pp. 1–75.
17. In pre-war Japan, the ultimate source of military command was the Japanese emperor,
whereas the ministers of army and navy took charge of the military administration. The
Taiwan governor-general was supervised by the Bureau of Taiwan Affairs headed by the
prime minister (1895–1929) or the minister of colonial affairs (since 1929).
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estic politics. As a result, nine civil governor-generals of different
partisan backgrounds served between 1919 and 1936.18
Although none the powers that checked the colonial government rested
on native Taiwanese, the anti-government elite did find a greater leverage
to affect policy-making. As long as public opinion in the Japanese
homeland was divided, the Taiwanese elite, now fluent in Japanese, could
find their sympathizers. It turned out that the real challenge for the
Taiwanese leaders was how to balance between two strategies that were
contradictory though both justifiable. By playing down their own identity
and instead stressing that they were also Japanese citizens, the Taiwanese
could ask for equal civil rights. Alternatively, they could emphasize their
distinctiveness, but with the risk of losing the support of Japanese
assimilationists. Self-determination and equal citizenship were both desir-
able goals, but not obtainable at the same time.
On the other side, the Japanese colonizers also hovered between
assimilation and non-assimilation policies. Strategic interaction between
the two groups thus created an interesting dynamics of identity politics.
When Lin Hsien-t’ang, a prominent Taiwanese leader, espoused the
strategy of “equalization through assimilation” and organized the Taiwan
Assimilation Society (Taiwan do¯kakai) in 1914, the colonial government
ordered it to dissolve. When the Japanese government finally shifted to
homeland extensionism in the early 1920s, the Taiwanese were no longer
satisfied with assimilation. With the formation of the Taiwan Cultural
Association (Taiwan bunka kyo¯kai) in 1921, the anti-government move-
ment soon shifted to an emphasis on Taiwan’s peculiarity and petitioned
for the establishment of a parliament for Taiwan. Although implicit, the
underlying assumption of the petition movement was the ethnic distinc-
tion of the people of Taiwan.
In retrospect, the aims of the counter-elite and the colonial government
were rarely in tune, even though both sides once pursued compatible
goals. Still, the nascent ethnic consciousness never made its way to a
full-fledged nationalistic movement, because of the friction in other issue
dimensions. To the conservatives, their interests could be better repre-
sented in a Taiwanese parliament than in the Japanese Diet, where they
were destined to be a minority.19 Their emphasis on Taiwan’s identity
was therefore highly strategic. Interestingly, the radicals also viewed the
identity issue strategically. The Taiwan Communist Party (formed in
1928) asserted “Taiwan racial independence” and “establishment of the
Republic of Taiwan,” but only in so far as the republic was a communist
one.
Thus the issue of national identity did not even surface when the
anti-government movement suffered from internal schisms and gradually
dissolved. By the mid-1930s, even the moderate petition movement was
18. Thus, the average term for each governor-general was two years. By contrast, seven
governor-generals served between 1895 and 1919 (each stayed 3.6 years in average), and three
served between 1936 and 1945 (3.3 years in average).
19. Taiwan minbao (12 December 1926).
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quenched. Disintegrated and defenceless, counter-elites of different
camps faced a tough choice on national identity again. For the radicals,
the problem was where to seek asylum after they were forced to go
underground or abroad. Communist parties in Japan and China provided
different opportunities and each held their own visions of nation building.
The landed class had no choice but to accept the government’s assimi-
lation plan in exchange for security.
This dilemma came to an unexpected solution as war became immi-
nent. By the mid-1930s, Japan was on the brink of a total war with China,
and Taiwan had been transformed from a supplement to Japan’s capitalist
development into a factory of military supplies. With the upgrade of
Taiwan’s strategic values, measures were taken to strengthen the mobi-
lization capacity of the colonial government. The exact measures in-
volved a series of institutional transformations, developed in line with the
assimilation policy. Especially notable is the institutional reform on
self-government in 1935, a year after the petition movement ended.
According to the new laws, province (shu¯) and city (shi) councils were
given the power to make decisions that the executives could overrule.
Partial and limited elections were introduced to select half the members
of the city, street (kai), and village (sho¯) councils, who then elect half the
members of the provincial councils.20 Through several local elections
held between 1935 and 1945, the Taiwanese leaders were fully incorpor-
ated into a new system in which they could participate but not dominate.
Many of the anti-government elite not only joined the election and got
elected, but also participated in other collaborative organizations in the
years to follow.21
When Japan found the battlefield in the Chinese mainland a quagmire
and tried to break out through the sea, Taiwan’s role was changed into a
naval military base. The colonial regime was transformed again, leaving
a deep mark on identity formation that was to exert a traumatic imprint
after the war. Kobayashi Seizo¯, a retired navy admiral who became the
17th governor-general in 1936, outlined three policies for the colonial
government: to “Japanize” the Taiwanese people, to build military indus-
tries and to turn Taiwan into a base for southward advance.
Kobayashi’s assumption of office marked a new phase of regime
transformation: the restoration of the military governorship. Unlike their
counterparts in the early occupation period, however, the wartime mili-
tary governor-generals no longer ruled by the biological principle, but
implemented the assimilation policy in an assertive way. With the
movement of “converting (the colonial people) into the imperial subjects”
20. The electoral law adopted the multi-member district single nontransferable vote
system, still in existence today. As the law imposed strict constraints on the right to vote, the
percentage of eligible voters was very low. Nevertheless, it was enough to include most
landlords and professionals, hence the elite class.
21. Chen Ming-tong and Lin Jih-wen, “Taiwan difang xuanju zhi qiyuan yu guojia shehui
guanxi zhi zhuanbian” (“The origin of Taiwan’s local elections and the transformation of
state-society relations”), in Chen Ming-tong and Zheng Yongnian (eds.), Liangan jiceng
xuanju yu zhengzhi shehui bianqian (Local Election on Both Sides of the Straits) (Taipei:
Yuedan chubanshe, 1998).
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(ko¯minka, that is “Japanization”), the colonial government enforced the
adoption of Japanese customs, religion, language and even names. The
number of school children accepting Japanese education rose sharply
during this period, indicating the progress of the movement. Classical
Chinese was totally removed from the curriculum in 1937 and all private
schools for Chinese education were banned in 1940, whereas the percent-
age of Taiwanese pupils in elementary schools rose to 71.17 per cent by
the end of the war.22
Meanwhile, native society was fully politicized to ensure the success of
the new policies. Not only was the colonial government turned into a
command post, but also every street corner was caught in the war
machine. At the top of the state apparatus hierarchy was the governor-
general, served by the navy admirals between 1936 and 1944 and sharing
power with the Taiwan army commander. Both posts received commands
from their homeland superiors, and clashed when Japan’s marine and
continental strategies came into conflict. The military, even in wartime,
had a limited and cryptic presence on the island. It was the police who
carried the baton for the colonial state and kept watchful eyes on the
native communities. To the ordinary Taiwanese, the police formed the
major interface between the colonial government and their neighbour-
hoods.
The colonial government intensified its penetration into local com-
munities as Japan enlarged its battlefront. In 1940, it installed the “Public
Service Association of the Imperial Subjects” (ko¯min ho¯ko¯kai) to promote
the movement of spiritual mobilization. Headed by the executive of each
administrative level, the Association monitored even minute details of the
everyday life of ordinary Taiwanese. Taiwanese elites, including many
who had participated in the anti-government movement a decade earlier,
had no choice but to assist the Association as local agents.
By the end of the Second World War, the colonial government had
been enforcing assimilation policies for more than two decades. The
impact on identity formation, however, varied across age and social class.
For the old and uneducated, the Japanization movement came too late to
lead their socialization. Aged gentry with a Chinese education might find
the Japanization movement an embarrassment, but had to remain sub-
missive to protect their class interests. The younger members of the local
elite, irrespective of their earlier response to colonial rule, were apt to
think and act like their Japanese counterparts. They could detect the
politics behind the Japanization movement but were also sensitive to
political risks and, when no other alternatives existed, chose to become
collaborators. The most vulnerable target of the Japanization movement
turned out to be the social marginals who reached their adolescence
during the war. The Japanese imperium gave these youngsters not only
hopes but also education and job opportunities. It is therefore not
22. Taiwan so¯tokufu, Statistical Books (1945), p. 39. For the impact of Japanese education,
see E. Patricia Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895–1945 (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1977).
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surprising that the aborigines became the most loyal warriors of the
Japanese imperium, even though their tribes were ruthlessly demolished
in Musha (Wushe) in 1930.
Overall, the state of national identity in Taiwan around the end of the
Second World War was nebulous, but several elements remain evident.
With a shared resentment of colonial rule and the development of a
common social space, sub-ethnic categories gave way to the concept of
Taiwanese (Taiwanren) in public discourse. Still, few people questioned
their Han Chinese identity. Politically, Taiwan residents lived with their
(partial) Japanese citizenship with little difficulty. It is groundless to
declare the Japanization movement a big success, just as it is impossible
to extract from the inchoate Taiwanese consciousness a firm base of
national identity. For both sides, identity formation had been a highly
politicized process. The colonizers designed their policies along two
dimensions: to use force or not, to assimilate or not. The Taiwanese elite
also wandered between two identities: a secondary Japanese who enjoys
some political powers, or a non-Japanese who is disenfranchised. The
final outcome was determined by the strategic interaction between the
two sides and the constraints each faced.23
Despite the precarious state of national identity in the late colonial
period, one thing is certain: the regime in Taiwan had been completely
transformed, from one based on repressive mechanisms24 into one relying
on information superiority.25 The colonial infrastructure was inherited by
the Nationalist government after the war, and played crucial roles in the
KMT’s regime instalment. It was the unsolved issue of national identity
that pushed Taiwan into another turbulent cycle of nation-building.
The Evolution of the Nationalist E´ migre´ Regime (1945–1996)
With Japan’s unconditional surrender in August 1945, Taiwan was
once again war booty. Under a plan drawn up by Allied leaders, the
island was retroceded to China, now under the Nationalist government.
The retrocession was virtually pre-ordained to have tragic consequences,
as the Chinese on the mainland and the native Taiwanese had experienced
distinctively different modern state-building and nationalist struggle over
the previous half century. The social, political and cultural gaps between
23. A way to see the strategic nature of the Japanization movement is to compare Taiwan
and Korea. In Korea, the movement was promoted more intensively but incurred a more
negative response. See Wan-yao Chou, “The Ko¯minka movement in Taiwan and Korea:
comparisons and interpretations,” in Peter Duus, Mark Peattie and Ramon Myers (eds.), The
Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp.
40–68.
24. During the final phase of armed resistance, 1,435 persons were gaoled under the Decree
of Bandit Punishment. Since the Decree was replaced by the Security Maintenance Law, the
number imprisoned was reduced to less than 100 each year. See Xingzheng zhangguan
gongshu, Statistical Summary, pp. 494–95.
25. The colonial regime underwent gradual evolution and expansion. The ratio of Taiwan
residents to government officials was 230 in 1905 and 99 in 1940. In the meantime, the number
of divisions in the Taiwan colonial government tripled. Ibid. pp. 348–49, 354. The Taiwan
government also centralized the control of the mass media in the last days of its colonial rule.
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the two groups were huge. The island had experienced a protracted period
of stable social and economic development and, as a consequence, was
more modern than most of the Chinese mainland. The whole island
shared a unified system of administration, law, education, commerce and
agriculture under a repressive and ubiquitous colonial state. The colonial
boundaries and rules were instrumental in shaping a shared sense of
social space and identity among the residents of Taiwan. Colonial rule
had also introduced new cultural values and world views, under which
Taiwan was accorded a semi-peripheral status superior to China within
the Japanese imperium. In particular, the second-generation islanders
groomed under the colonial rule had acquired a sense of history and
cultural identity intrinsically different from the historical consciousness
of mainland Chinese.
The abrupt ending of colonial rule turned the world upside down for a
great majority of the native Taiwanese elite, whose newly acquired
language and cultural skills and political credentials were suddenly
degraded into a potential liability under a returned Chinese regime. The
Nationalists took over the island without a carefully-prepared retrocession
plan as Taiwan was only a sideshow to their grander effort to recover all
of China after the war. The new administration under the administrator-
general and garrison commander Chen Yi paid little attention to the
aspiration for equality of the disoriented native elites. Mainlanders and
half-mountains26 were favoured over native Taiwanese in filling up the
vast government vacancies left behind by the Japanese. The economy
deteriorated rapidly. Taiwan’s resources were siphoned off to the main-
land by the Nationalists to fuel their military struggle with the Commu-
nists and by corrupt carpetbaggers to enrich themselves. The transmission
of hyper-inflation from the mainland to Taiwan had a devastating impact
on the war-torn island economy. Also, a myriad of disputes erupted over
the confiscation of the assets formerly owned by the Japanese.27 By the
time a large number of frustrated and jobless Taiwanese conscripts from
South China and South-East Asia returned in late 1946 and early 1947,
the island was already at boiling point.
On 28 February 1947, a single event of police brutality sparked an
island-wide popular uprising.28 The Nationalists responded with a harsh
military crackdown. Thousands of native Taiwanese, including numerous
well-educated and well-respected social elites, were persecuted and
purged. Many lives were also lost as a result of internal strife among
faction-based security and intelligence organs during the crackdown.
After the incident, the Nationalists made some attempts to placate the
26. Half-mountains (or banshan) were viewed by the native as token Taiwanese who had
spent the war years in China and were recruited by the Nationalist government. For the origins
of half-mountains and their role in post-War retrogression, see Bruce Jacob, “Taiwanese and
the Chinese nationalist, 1937–1945,” Modern China, Vol. 16, No. 1 (January 1990), pp.
84–118.
27. A major source of the dispute arises from the token transfer of assets from private
Japanese to their native Taiwanese friends on the eve of the hand-over.
28. Tse-han Lai, Raymond Myers and Wou Wei, A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan
Uprising of February 28, 1947 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).
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local people. They upgraded Taiwan from a special military zone to a
province and called for immediate local elections. Chiang Kai-shek also
replaced Chen Yi with Wei Tao-ming, a civilian. But these measures
were too late and too little.
The tragic event had a profound and lasting effect on the Taiwanese
people. It became a lightening-rod event that constantly reminded them of
their “common sorrow.” It transfigured a latent Taiwanese nationalism
into a burgeoning independence movement, launched first by the native
elites who went into exile in Japan after the incident. This lasting scar
also complicated the efforts by the Nationalists to reconstruct a cultural
and ethnic unity between the mainlanders and native Taiwanese through
state-sponsored resinicization programmes in later years. The only tan-
gible benefit of the incident to the Nationalists was that it drove a
generation of politically conscious social elites into self-imposed political
passiveness. The political acquiescence of the native elites created the
conditions for a sweeping three-phased land reform, which was first
introduced in 1948 to pre-empt communist insurgence in the countryside
and, inadvertently, laid the foundation for post-war economic reconstruc-
tion and a more equitable pattern of economic growth.
When Chiang Kai-shek retreated from mainland to Taiwan with his
mainlander followers and million-strong troops around the end of 1949,
everyone, including the Truman administration, anticipated that his days
were numbered as the Chinese Civil War was entering its final stage.
Then, however, came another dramatic twist for the people of Taiwan.
The outbreak of Korean War on 25 June 1950 suddenly extended the
lease on the life of the Nationalists for another half century. The
resumption of U.S. military and economic aid helped the Nationalist state
apparatus and armed forces stay afloat. Soon after the formal partition of
Vietnam in 1954, the United States institutionalized its security commit-
ment to Taiwan by signing the U.S.–ROC Mutual Defence Treaty. Thus,
a new security demarcation in East Asia gave the Nationalists a historic
chance to consolidate a one-party authoritarian regime on new social soil.
The post-1949 KMT authoritarianism was constructed on a quadripar-
tite foundation – an elaborate and centralized party apparatus, a system of
extra-constitutional legal arrangements and emergency decrees, a con-
trolled electoral pluralism implemented at the local level, and structural
symbiosis between the party and the state. Learning from his disastrous
defeat on the mainland, Chiang Kai-shek responded to the challenge of
political reconstruction with an ambitious party reorganization plan,
officially launched on 5 August 1950.29 Factionalism in the security and
intelligence apparatus was eliminated. The system of political commis-
sars for the military was re-established. Between 1950 and 1952, party
leadership was drastically re-composed. Hierarchical party organs were
installed at all levels of the state apparatus and representative bodies.
29. For an excellent analysis of the political background of the party reorganization plan,
see Chia-Lung Lin, “Paths to democracy: Taiwan in comparative perspective,” Ph.D
dissertation, Department of Political Science, Yale University (1998), ch. 3.
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Party cells reached into all organized social sectors, such as labour
unions, youth groups, religious groups, professional associations, busi-
ness associations, farmers’ associations, women’s associations, schools
and mass media.
Party membership grew by more than 150 per cent between 1950 and
1954, from 168,719 to 403,260 (one KMT member for every ten adult
males). It was concentrated disproportionally in the military and state
bureaucracy (especially at the level of central government), in the urban
social sectors, and among the mainlanders, who still accounted for 73.6
per cent of total membership.30 This indicated that penetration of the party
apparatus into the countryside and among the native Taiwanese was
relatively weak during the initial phase of regime instalation. Neverthe-
less, the party reorganization of the early 1950s created a structure of
personified power centralization anchored on the paramount leader, se-
cured a stable, homogeneous and non-competitive process of elite recruit-
ment, and laid the organizational foundation for the KMT to establish its
hegemonic presence in society.
The KMT’s re-organizational task was made easier by the procla-
mation of a general state of siege on Taiwan on 19 May 1949. The
imposition of martial law greatly expanded the scope of power of Taiwan
garrison command and suspended the protection of civil rights guaranteed
in the 1947 ROC Constitution.31 Furthermore, many important provisions
of the constitution were replaced or superseded by the so-called
“Temporary Articles” and a series of special legislation under the rubric
of “During the Period of Mobilization and Combating Rebellion.” To-
gether, they threw the country into a permanent state of emergency.
These extra-constitutional arrangements were steadily expanded during
the 1950s and 1960s.32 In their final form, they provided the president
with extensive emergency powers, invalidated the two-term limit on
presidency, suspended the re-election of the three national representative
bodies – the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control
Yuan – extended the tenure of their incumbent members for life, and
deferred the election of provincial and municipal heads indefinitely.
The KMT introduced elections for township head, county/city council
and country/city magistrate in 1950, and popular election for the Taiwan
Provincial Assembly in 1954 to incorporate a diversified local elite into
the process of party-building and to provide the authoritarian system with
a modicum of democratic fac¸ade. The KMT leadership discovered a
proven formula for controlling a limited popular electoral process by
employing the old trick of “divide-and-rule.” At the grass-roots level,
30. Ibid. pp. 75–77.
31. The mainlander elite chose freezing, not abolishing, the 1947 Constitution. For them,
the ROC Constitution is irreplaceable because it is the quintessential legal embodiment of the
one-China principle. It was adopted when the Nationalist government still exercised effective
governance over a majority part of China, including Taiwan, and was internationally
recognized by all major powers.
32. Fu Hu, “The mutation and reconstruction of the constitutional structure,” National
Taiwan University Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1987), pp. 1–32.
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existing patron–client networks were incorporated into the party structure.
Within each administrative district below the provincial level, the KMT
nurtured and kept at least two competing local factions striving for public
offices and other electoral offices in many quasi-state organizations,
such as farmers’ associations and irrigation associations, and more
importantly, for a share of region-based economic rents in the non-
tradable goods sector to be distributed by the party-directed local spoils
system.33
The local factions and central party leadership developed a mutual
dependence. On the one hand, the smooth functioning of the vote-buying
mechanism, irregular campaign practices and the local spoil system
depended on the indulgence of the various state regulatory and law-
enforcement agencies, which were under the influence of the party. On
the other hand, the patron–client networks helped the party to extend its
reach into local communities. Also, the fierce competition among the
factions crowded out opposition candidates in local elections. On top of
this, the central leadership could claim the overall electoral victory
delivered by disparate local factions. Thus, the combined mobilizing
strength of the KMT party and the local factions virtually without
exception delivered more than two-thirds of popular votes and three-
quarters of seats in all elections, especially the more significant country
magistrate and Provincial Assembly elections, for more than three
decades until the political opening of the late 1980s (see Table 1).
From the very beginning, there existed a structural symbiosis between
the party and the state. This manifested itself at three levels of state-build-
ing. First, it meant a fusion of party and state, in both organizational and
personnel terms. Secondly, it meant mutual dependence between the two
over key functional areas. The party provided the only co-ordinating
mechanism among disparate arms of the state. It also helped maintain the
ideological coherence of state through a system of elite recruitment and
training programmes for the appointment and promotion of senior
government officials and military officers. In addition, the party regulated
the access of social actors to the state. On the other hand, the party relied
on the resources and coercive power of the state to preserve its institu-
tional prerogatives and to squash any attempt to form an alternative
power bloc. Under the rule of martial law, the security authority was
prepared to suppress even a hint of political stirring. The state privileged
the party in controlling the organizational bases for interest intermediary.
The party dominated the selection of leadership for all state-sanctioned
corporatist organizations and provided the only organizational link across
different social sectors. The party also relied on a vast array of state-
owned enterprises to cushion the economic security of loyalist mainlan-
der followers.
Thirdly, symbiosis meant that the legitimacy of one-party authoritari-
33. See Joseph Bosco, “Taiwan factions: guanxi, patronage and the state in local politics,”
in Murray Rubinstein (ed.), The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present (Armonk, NY: M. E.
Sharpe, 1994).
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Table 1: Local Factions and KMT Shares of Votes and Seats in Provincial Assembly and
County Magistrate/City Mayor Elections (1954–1994)
Taiwan Provincial Assembly elections County Magistrate/City Mayor elections
KMT’s KMT’s
KMT’s local KMT’s local
share factions’ KMT’s share factions’ KMT’s
of share of share of Total of share of share of Total
Year votes (%) seats seats seats votes (%) seats seats seats
1954 68.8 27 48 57 71.8 17 19 21
1957 67.8 28 53 66 65.0 16 20 21
1960 65.4 29 58 73 72.0 16 19 21
1963 68.0 32 61 74 – – – –
1964 – – – – 73.1 16 17 21
1968 75.5 27 60 71 72.4 15 17 20
1972 68.9 23 58 73 78.6 9 20 20
1977 64.1 32 56 77 70.4 7 16 20
1981 70.3 25 59 77 59.4 12 15 19
1985 69.8 34 59 77 62.6 13 17 21
1989 64.0 30 55 77 56.1 13 14 21
1993 – – – – 47.3 8 13 21
1994 51.0 26 48 79 – – – –
Average 66.7 39.08 % 76.78 % – 66.2 62.83 % 82.74 % –
Source:
Data provided by the Political System and Change Workshop, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan
University
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anism was ultimately tied to the legitimacy of the state structure. The
justification for a system of extra-constitutional legal arrangements and
emergency decrees and the revolutionary mandate of the KMT party were
both founded on the so-called “one-China” principle, which sustained the
claim that there is only one China, Taiwan is part of China, and the ROC
government is the sole legitimate government representing the whole of
China. The mismatch between the ROC’s de jure jurisdiction (China) and
de facto one (Taiwan) was meant to be transitory. This precarious
sovereign claim turned out to be the most unsettling legitimating pillar for
the e´migre´ regime. First, the sovereign status of the ROC faced the
challenge of the PRC’s conflicting claim and its unceasing threat of
forced retrocession. Both Beijing and Taipei sought an exclusive repre-
sentation of all of China in the international community. The ROC’s
precarious sovereign status, for an extended period following the out-
break of the Korean War, was sustained essentially by American hege-
mony. It was the United States-initiated international recognition,
including membership of the United Nations and a seat on Security
Council before 1971, that elongated KMT’s fictional sovereign claim
until the end of 1979.
The initial structural characteristics as well as institutional arrange-
ments of the one-party authoritarianism had profound implications for its
adaptation, evolution and eventual transition. First, the political security
of the e´migre´ regime was highly susceptible to pressure from the inter-
national system, especially a redirection in American China policy and/or
the PRC’s reunification strategy. External developments and interventions
defined a number of critical junctures for its evolution. The steady
consolidation of the North-East Asian security demarcation during the
1950s was the driving force behind the shift in the raison d’eˆtre of the
Nationalist state from “recovering the mainland” to “building the anti-
communist bastion (Taiwan).” During the 1958 Quemoy and Matsu
crisis, Chiang Kai-shek succeeded in rejecting the American demand to
abandon the offshore islands, but he was eventually persuaded to give up
any plan for waging military operations on the mainland under intense
pressures from the Kennedy administration in 1961–62.34 As a conse-
quence, the KMT leadership had to update its historical mission, from
anti-communist crusade to securing the island’s self-defence, inter-
national standing and economic prospect.
The American intervention was also instrumental in the economic
reforms of the early 1960s, which set the island on a path of export-
oriented industrialization. It took an American threat to reduce the aid
package to expedite the centrepiece measure, the 19-point programme of
economic and financial reform, through the bureaucracy in 1960.35 The
success of export-oriented industrialization defined a new arena for
co-operation between the e´migre´ regime and the native society, gradually
shifted economic power from the state to the private business community,
34. Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship (Brookings, 1992), pp. 32–33.
35. Neil Jacob, U.S. Aid to Taiwan (New York: Praeger, 1996), pp. 134–35.
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and created a new outward-looking business elite comprised primarily of
owners of small and medium-sized enterprises.
A crisis of international legitimacy provided the initial impetus for the
demise of authoritarianism and eventually transition to democracy. The
PRC–U.S. rapprochment in the early 1970s pulled the rug from under the
feet of the KMT leadership. The official one-China principle crumbled
amid diplomatic setback, the loss of the UN seat to the PRC in 1971 and
de-recognition by major allies throughout the 1970s. The de-recognition
crisis was immediately followed by a series of peace overtures initiated
by Communist China starting in 1979. In the early 1980s, the de´tente
atmosphere in the Straits began to melt down the siege mentality among
the public and weakened the rationale for retaining martial law. The KMT
leadership felt compelled to respond to the crisis by enhancing its own
democratic legitimacy at home through a steady opening of the electoral
process. Opening of elections to national representative bodies was first
instituted in 1972, and it was expanded in 1980 and again in 1989.36
Finally, in the transition to a post-Cold War era, the political and
territorial integrity of many existing states was seriously challenged. In
many instances, the international community was receptive to claims of
rights to self-determination, autonomy or secession. At the same time, the
emerging structural configuration of the Asia-Pacific security order has
made more room for Taiwan’s diplomatic manoeuvring as the long-term
goals of China, as the major power aspirant, would be potentially in
conflict with that of a defending hegemony (the United States) and a
regional rivalry (Japan). These developments have evidently lifted the
hopes of the pro-independence camp and shifted internal debate in favour
of an independent Taiwanese statehood.37
As it turned out, the structural symbiosis between party and state was
as much a source of strength as a root of vulnerability for the KMT
regime. As the transplanted state deepened its dependence on Taiwanese
society for fiscal revenue, and supply of military conscripts and rank-and-
file state personnel, the incumbent elite necessarily became more suscep-
tible to local demand and concern. With the steady drain of American aid
after the early 1960s, the incumbent elite was compelled to place more
emphasis on local economic accumulation. The Nationalist government
launched its military conscription in Taiwan as early as 1951, but the real
reproduction crisis began to surface when most mainlander soldiers
reached decommission age in the early 1960s. For the professional officer
corps, large-scale replacement by native Taiwanese came much later as
the military academies recruited more rigorously from the offspring of the
mainlander veteran families, and the native Taiwanese consciously
avoided military careers. But the trend of increasing indigenization was
36. For an narrative account of the gradual electoral opening, see Yun-han Chu, Crafting
Democracy in Taiwan (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1992), ch. 3.
37. Yun-han Chu and Chia-lung Lin, “Democratization and growth of Taiwanism:
competing nationalisms and national (in)security,” paper delivered at the Second Annual
Conference of the EU-China Academic Network (ECAN), Centro de Estudios de Asia
Oriental, Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, Spain, 2–22 January 1999.
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inevitable and accelerated over time. For the state bureaucracy, native
Taiwanese accounted for 56.5 per cent of the overall civil service and
only 37.3 per cent of the civil servants working for central government in
1959. By the end of 1991, their percentage in the overall civil service was
71 per cent and among those working for central government, 66.2 per
cent.38 The indigenization of the state necessarily transformed the profile
of the KMT membership and eventually the outlooks of the party
leadership.
Practising a functional sovereign state on Taiwan over time had by
itself done more damage than anything else on the official one-China
claim. When the Nationalists moved their capital from Nanjing to Taipei
in 1949, they essentially endowed Taiwan with a de facto sovereign
status. Growing political and ideological cleavage between Taiwan and
the mainland further confused a local population already disenchanted
with the concept of Chinese reunification. Long-term separation across
the Taiwan Straits also precipitated the assimilation of the mainlander
group steadily into local society. Finally, recurring war-preparation
against possible PRC aggression fostered alienation from mainland China
and a shared sense of destiny between the mainlander and native Tai-
wanese. The jurisdictional boundaries and legal order set by a de facto
sovereign state quietly fostered a popular aspiration for a separate state-
hood. Thus, the KMT’s nationalistic vision was in fact undermined by the
intrinsic mismatch between the de jure state structure and its actual
practice of a sovereign state on Taiwan over more than four decades.
Another important source for the transformation of one-party authori-
tarianism was the inherent contradiction between the political imperative
to limit electoral pluralism and the success in state-sponsored economic
modernization. First, the nature and significance of the electoral mecha-
nisms were bound to change amid rapid socio-economic transformation.
They were transformed from a sideshow to the authoritarian order into a
primary legitimating device. During the 1960s and 1970s, local elections
steadily evolved into a major institution to assimilate emerging economic
and social forces into the political system, and an indispensable vehicle
for the political ascent of the native elite.
Secondly, as the legitimating function of the electoral mechanism rose,
the power equation between the party leadership and local factions
gradually shifted in favour of the latter. Unfortunately, the KMT could
not find viable alternatives to local factions in mobilizing electoral
support. A deliberate effort by Chiang Ching-kuo to replace them with
young native cadres groomed by the party in the early 1970s met with
stringent resistance and was eventually abandoned.39 At the same time,
38. Civil servants include bureaucrats, public school teachers and state-owned enterprises
employees. See Statistical Bulletin of the Ministry of Civil Service, various years.
39. This policy backfired in the 1977 election, in which an unprecedented number of
dissidents were elected to the Provincial Assembly because the defiant local factions refused
to support party-nominated candidates. See Ming-tong Chen, “Local factions and elections
in Taiwan’s democratization,” in Hung-mao Tien (ed.), Taiwan’s Electoral Politics and
Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995).
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the leverage of the party over local factions declined as the local
administrative apparatus and quasi-state organizations were increasingly
staffed by native bureaucrats affiliated with local factions. Thirdly, the
social transformation brought about by the rapid industrialization and the
accompanying demographic changes tended to enhance the mobilizing
capacity of opposition candidates. The opposition found a growing
number of ready ears among an increasingly politically conscious and
economically secured middle-class electorate and among the economic
laggard groups.
By the late 1970s, a new cohort of post-war generation political
opposition emerged. Unlike most of the previous independent candidates,
who had no national political aims, or the vocal mainlander dissidents of
the 1960s,40 whose influence was largely confined to the intellectual
circle, the new opposition established political identity as well as built
electoral support on a platform emphasizing democratic reform and
Taiwanese identity. This development lead to a major breakthrough in the
local election of 1977, in which a loosely co-ordinated opposition group,
Tangwai, literally outside the (KMT) party, made considerable gains in
contesting local offices and Provincial Assembly seats. In the vigorously
contested election of the Taoyuan county magistrate, a riot in Chungli
stopped the KMT local officials from vote-rigging. In retrospect, the
Chungli incident epitomized the beginning of a protracted demise of the
authoritarian regime. The restraining of the KMT leadership in the use of
coercive measures during the incident helped the opposition to overcome
an important psychological threshold. Thus, the 1977 election set in
motion a drive to form an island-wide alliance among the opposition
candidates based on an updated belief about the vulnerability of the
regime. The momentum of the opposition movement was temporarily
disrupted by the arrest of some Tangwai leaders in the aftermath of the
Kaohsiung (Formosa) Incident of December 1979. But Tangwai soon
regrouped and renewed its drive to form a quasi-party after the 1983
supplementary legislative election. This time the opposition movement
was reinforced by a mushrooming of social movements, representing all
kinds of socio-economic laggard groups and newly awakened environ-
mentalists and consumer rights activists. The social movements of the
1980s loosened the firm grip of the authoritarian state on the civil society
and provided a mobilized soil in various social sectors for the political
opposition to take root.41 Finally, on the eve of the 1986 election, a new
opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was declared
in defiance of the official ban.
The one-party authoritarianism also suffered from its internal weak-
ness. The KMT’s power structure, like any other dictatorship-for-life, was
40. The vocal mainlander dissidents of the 1960s were best represented by many of the
associates of the Free China Journal. See Mab Huang, Intellectual Ferment for Political
Reforms in Taiwan (Ann Arbor: Center of Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1976).
41. See Yun-han Chu, “Social protest and political democratization in Taiwan,” in Murray
Rubinstein (ed.), Other Voices/Other Visions: Responses to Directed Political and
Socio-economic Change in Taiwan, 1945–1991 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994).
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liable to succession crises. Many institutional mechanisms might cease
to function properly without the paramount leader. When power trans-
ferred from Chiang Kai-shek to his oldest son, Chiang Ching-kuo, in the
late 1960s, the succession was initially relatively smooth as Chiang
Ching-kuo had been groomed by his father for the post for well over two
decades. Nevertheless, without the historical stature of his father and
foreseeing the legitimacy crisis of the regime, Chiang tried to broaden
his social support by recruiting more native Taiwanese to the party and
state leadership and upgrading the industrialization process with large-
scale infrastructure projects. This culminated in his decision to nominate
Lee Teng-hui, a native, as the vice-president and his official successor in
March 1984. A succession crisis loomed after Chiang’s deteriorating
health became publicly known in 1985. During the last few years of
his tenure, he initiated a series of political reforms to prevent a future
deeper crisis. His decision to tolerate the forming of the DPP in 1986
and the subsequent announcement, only a week after the birth of the
DPP, of his intention to lift martial law and many long-time political
bans, were a watershed in Taiwan’s regime transition. They essentially
pushed the process of authoritarian breakdown over the point of no
return.
However, the incumbent-initiated political liberalization was initially
intended to be a directed political change. The KMT and the KMT-
affiliated local factions still retained enormous electoral resources. In
addition, the party continued to enjoy a firm grip on the organized sectors
of the civil society and had under its direct control substantial financial
and media resources, giving it a certain flexibility in responding to the
opposition’s demand for democratic reform.42 It was further helped by the
fact that society had little divisive socio-economic cleavage which might
be exploited by the opposition and translated into polarized political
cleavage. This strengthened the hands of the incumbent elite in setting the
limits on the scope and speed of democratic reform.
The passing Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988 hastened the break-
down of the one-party authoritarian rule. The built-in succession mechan-
ism put Lee Teng-hui in charge of political reform. The intra-party power
struggle between the so-called mainstream and non-mainstream factions43
inadvertently accelerated the trend of Taiwanization, provided the im-
petus for abandoning the KMT’s core commitment to Chinese national-
ism, partially checked the natural tendency of the entrenched incumbent
elite to restrict the scope of democratic reform, and facilitated ideological
accommodation with the opposition on the issue of democratic reform
and national identity. On his way to power consolidation, Lee skilfully
shifted the burden of defending the orthodox lines – defending the
extra-constitutional arrangements amid a global wave of democratization,
42. See Jih-wen Lin, “Democratization under one-party dominance: explaining Taiwan’s
paradoxical transition,” Issues & Studies, Vol. 35, No. 6 (1999).
43. See Hung-mao Tien and Yun-han Chu, “Taiwan’s domestic political reforms,
institutional change and power realignment,” in Gary Klintworth (ed.), Taiwan in the
Asia-Pacific in the 1990s (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994).
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insisting on the one-China principle when virtually all major nations had
shifted their diplomatic recognition to the PRC, and upholding a Chinese
identity in the wake of a re-emergence of Taiwanese identity – to his
rivalry.
The accumulation of animosity and distrust simply hardened the
resolve of Lee and his allies to accelerate the trend of Taiwanization and
speed up institutional reforms, especially in the direction that would
effectively undermine the power base of his rivals. After the abolition of
the Temporary Articles in May 1991 and three phases of KMT-directed
constitutional revision in the first half of 1990s, most of the legal
obstacles that hindered a normal functioning of representative democracy
were removed. The December 1992 Legislative Yuan election brought in
a new parliament wholly elected for the first time by the people of
Taiwan. It was also the first time that the KMT formally surrendered its
governing position to a democratic contest, and signalled the end of the
mainlanders’ dominance in national politics. Hau Bei-tsun was forced to
resign from the premier post after the election, and, as a consequence, the
non-mainstream faction was thoroughly marginalized from the power
centre.44 From this point on, Lee enjoyed the full control of the state as
well as the party apparatus. He introduced more constitutional change to
move the system away from parliamentarianism to semi-presidentialism
and redefine the cultural orientation of the state, from cultivating Chinese
identity to endorsing the burgeoning Taiwanese consciousness.45
Lee has accomplished two seemingly impossible tasks. First, he engi-
neered a graceful extrication from one-party authoritarianism, making
Taiwan the only Third Wave democracy in which a quasi-Leninist party
not only survived an authoritarian breakdown but capitalized on the crisis
to its advantage. Secondly, he helped construct a new foundation for the
legitimacy of the ROC state structure without violent internal polarization
and external military intervention. Lee was able to refurbish the KMT’s
electoral dominance by moving the centre of electoral gravity away from
representative bodies to executive offices.46 He was able to harness the
independence zeal with a gradual defection from the one-China principle
and with a sensible alternative to the pursuit of de jure independence by
launching a concerted diplomatic effort to join the United Nations and its
related agencies since 1993 and promoting the so-called “Republic of
China on Taiwan” formula that anchors on a two-China model, culminat-
ing in his announcement of “special state-to-state” relation in July 1999.
44. See Tien-hung Mao and Yun-han Chu, “Building democratic institutions in Taiwan,”
The China Quarterly, No. 148 (December 1996), pp. 1103–32.
45. In his most revealing interview with Ryo¯taro Shiba, a well-known Japanese writer, in
autumn 1994, Lee spoke of “the misery of being a Taiwanese,” implying that Taiwan has,
for hundreds of years, been ruled by different foreign regimes and never got a chance to
determine its own fate. This widely-cited line came very close to a tacit endorsement for the
principle of self-determination.
46. See Yun-han Chu, “A born-again dominant party? The transformation of the
Kuomintang and Taiwan’s regime transition,” in Hermann Giliomee and Charles Simkins
(eds.), The Awkward Embrace: One Party Domination and Democracy (London: Harwood
Academic Publishers, 1999).
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Toward the end of 1990s, a new consensus on consolidating the sovereign
status of the ROC on Taiwan emerged.47 Recurring political participation
under a democratic regime helped develop a sense of collective con-
sciousness among the people, transforming the term “Taiwan” from a
geographic unit to a political community and the term “Taiwanese” from
an ethnic term for native Taiwanese to a civic term for citizens of Taiwan.
Most significantly, through indigenization and democratization, the so-
ciety managed to transform the raison d’eˆtre of the state in a fundamental
sense. The state was re-engineered to foster the growth of Taiwanese
nationalism and to consolidate the “re-imagined community” both at
home and in the international system.
Conclusion
Contrasting the two regime cycles. The milestones of Taiwan’s poli-
tical development in the 20th century are highlighted in Table 2. During
both regime cycles, new developments in the international system as well
as redirections in the policies of great powers in the region generated the
most important impetus for change at all major junctures of regime
evolution and transformation. But over time, the unintended consequence
of modern state-building exerted the most profound impact on state–
society relations. Initially the incumbent’s state-building project was
driven by the security and survival imperatives as well as the incumbent
elite’s nationalistic vision. But as the state became more dependent on the
native society for essential resources, it faced the task of local capitalist
accumulation. Towards the end of both cycles, the native society invari-
ably gained greater access to government positions and decisions through
broadened scope of citizenship and expanded avenues of interest articula-
tion, political representation and recruitment. Also, both regimes were
compelled to look for a way out of their imminent legitimacy crisis. In the
case of Japanese rule, the process of regime transition did not get the
chance to run its full course as it was abruptly truncated by the post-
Second World War settlement. In the case of the KMT rule, the incum-
bent elite exercised a graceful extrication from one-party authoritarianism
with an early adoption of the Taiwanization policy and an orderly
multi-phased instalment of democratic reform. Finally, a step-wise con-
solidation and indigenization of a modern sovereign state structured the
path of regime evolution and laid the material and structural foundation
for the development of nationalist aspirations beyond the comprehension
of the incumbent elite.
The regime cycles, despite their underlying similarities, produced
substantially different outcomes in terms of the development of political
society and the construction of collective identity. At the end of colonial
rule, home rule remained an aspiration, not a political reality; Taiwan had
not yet emerged as a self-contained political community with a distinctive
political identity, and the native elite had not yet forged a coherent
47. Chu and Lin, “Democratization and growth.”
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Table 2: Milestones in Taiwan’s Political Development (1895–1999)
Legal-institutional
framework; Representative
Major political Taiwan’s government bodies; opposition
Year issues international status structure Important policies parties
1895 Armed resistance. Special legal zone in Law No. 63. Decree of Biological politics of Government-appointed
Transition between the Japanese Imperium. Bandit Punishment Goto¯ Shinpei. Councils.
social systems. (1898). Military Extensive
Infrastructure governor-generals. investigations.
building. Infrastructure building.
Monopoly system.
1907 Nationalization of Law No. 31. Decree on
1918 unclaimed land. Police Authority.
Subjugation of
aborigines.
Establishment of
sugar industry.
1921 Non-violent Civilian governor-generals. Assimilation policy. Taiwan Cultural
1922 political Military Homeland Association (1921).
1927 movements. power transferred to extensionism. People’s Party of Taiwan.
Competition the Taiwan Army Taiwan Communist Party.
1928 between rice and Commander. Law No. Alliance of Self
1930 sugar crops. 3. Government.
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1934
1935 Turning Taiwan Partially elected local
1938 into war base. Wartime-legal system. Japanization Councils. Limited
Military governor-general. movement. Military suffrage. SNTV.
industrialization.
1944 Scheme to normalize Compulsory Wartime mobilization.
Taiwan’s administrative conscription applied to
status. Taiwanese.
1945 A province of the ROC Administrator-General. Violent suppression of
1946 Political and ROC constitution. The riots. Elections for Village and
economic takeover Five Powers Township
in factional strifes constitutional structure. Representatives. Elections
1948 and cultural rift. ROC constitution for County/City Councils
frozen by the and County/City
Temporary Provisions. magistrates.
1949 Settling down of De jure a province of Martial Law suspended. Land reform ( , 1953).
1951 the e´migre´ regime. the ROC; de facto an Freedom of speech and Four-year economic
Cold War. US aid. independent state. association. plan (1953). Encourage
Political and Party state under CKS. of Foreign Investment
economic Regulations (1954).
1954 stabilization. Law on Police Repression of
PRC’s military Authority revised to unyielding elites.
invasion. authorize Police Building of patron-client
intervention of civic network.
life.
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Table 2—continued
Legal-institutional
framework; Representative
Major political Taiwan’s government bodies; opposition
Year issues international status structure Important policies parties
1969 End of US aid. National Security Programme of Elections for the
Diplomatic Council. Economic and Finan- supplementary members
isolation and cial Reform (1960). of the National Assembly
legitimacy crisis. Economic Processing and the Legislative Yuan.
Challenge from Zone (1966).
1973 ethnic Taiwanese. CCK chaired the KMT Ten Major Construction
(1975) and assumed Plan (1973).
presidency (1977). Taiwanization policy.
1979 US recognized The Hinchu Industrial
1986 PRC. The Zone (1980). Democratic Progressive
Formosan Party.
Incident. Upsurge
of social protests.
1987 PRC’s economic Martial law lifted. Travel to the mainland
opening. Cross-strait allowed.
interaction.
Impetus of
Taiwanization and
democratization.
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1988 Lee Teng-hui chaired
the KMT and assumed
presidency.
1989 Party formation National Affairs
1990 permitted. Conference (1990).
Post-Cold War Law on Police
new world order. Authority abolished.
Faction- Temporary Provisions
circumscribed terminated.
1991 political. Criminal Code Art. 100 Six Years Construction
competition. revised. Plan.
Money politics. De facto recognition of
and corruption. the PRC through the
1992 terminations of the Complete relection of the
1993 Temporary Provisions Plan to restore UN Legislative Yuan. New
and Period of membership. Koo- Party.
Mobilization. Wang Talk.
1996 PRC’s military Lee Teng-hui directly Lee’s Taiwanization Direct presidential
1999 threat. Strategic Lee Tenghui’s remark elected president. Post-Lee policies. election.
alliance between on the special state-to- power transition.
the US and the state relation with
PRC. Economic the PRC.
integration with
the PRC.
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nationalist vision among themselves. In contrast, under KMT rule, the
electoral avenue was eventually expanded to allow full representation of
the island’s citizens in an emerging national political system and access
by the native elite to all principal public offices through open multi-party
competition; Taiwan emerged as a closely bound community with a
distinctive ethnic, cultural and historical identity.
The two regimes were never equal. In the first instance, the over-
whelming influence of the Japanese colonial legacies to a great extent
preordained the KMT regime to follow a different path of regime
transformation and the mainlander elite to confront formidable local
resistance to its nation-building agenda. Next, the KMT took Taiwan as
a province and used direct rule, while Japan took it as a colony and used
indirect rule. Also, there were significant differences in the nature and
progress of indigenization and consolidation between the two externally-
imposed states. The Japanese colonial state, for most of its existence,
used the interstate system as a subsidiary of the modern Japanese
nation-state and was never under any pressure to undertake a fully-
fledged indigenization strategy, not even during the height of the Pacific
War when the island colony was expected to be fully self-reliant.48 In
contrast, the transplanted Nationalist state, which was at first principally
manned by the minority mainlander group, was forced to adopt a
full-blown indigenization strategy as it was totally cut off from its home
base, territorially confined to the island, confronted with an acute repro-
duction crisis in the recruitment of state and military personnel, barred
from instituting a de jure apartheid between the mainlander and native
Taiwanese by its own notion of Chinese identity and citizenship, and
steadily more dependent on successful local economic development for
meeting its military and fiscal requirements. At the same time, while the
sovereign status of the transplanted Nationalist state was never firmly
constituted within the post-1949 interstate system, over time other sover-
eign states increasingly engaged Taiwan as a de facto sovereign state in
functional if not strictly legal terms. The consequences of full indigeniza-
tion of a transplanted state and the long-term practice of a functioning
sovereign state were perhaps beyond the comprehension of the e´migre´
elite. In time, the indigenization process blurred the artificial divide
between the local (provincial) and national politics and thus redefined the
political terrain on which the e´migre´ and native elites engaged with one
another, compelled the state to redefine the scope of citizenship in closer
accordance with the de facto territoriality, and subtly undermined the
official one-China claim while fostering popular aspiration for an inde-
pendent statehood.
While the Nationalists suffered from a much more fragile international
legitimacy from the very beginning, their rule was more advantageously
cushioned by an elaborate party apparatus that had been firmly in place
well before the island became fully industrialized. This apparatus, with its
48. For instance, the colonial state introduced universal conscription, a watershed event
on its movement toward indigenization, as late as January 1945.
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intermediary function between the state and native society, helped the
incumbent elite assimilate the newly emerged socio-economic elite into
the political system, controlled the scope of political contestation in
electoral process, and harnessed the politicizing effect of capitalist devel-
opment. However, there was a limit to the working of party apparatus in
obstructing the growth of the political opposition and in retarding the
emergence of a civil society amid rapid socio-economic transformation.
Taiwan at fin-de-sie`cle. Taiwan in the 20th century has been trans-
formed from a loosely governed peripheral province and frontier settle-
ment for Chinese immigrants under China’s imperial administration, into
a centrally administered and semi-autonomous colony under a modern
Japanese state, and into a self-contained sovereign entity under a trans-
planted Nationalist party-state. Over the century, the people of Taiwan
have also lived through a tortuous search for their collective identity.
They have been enmeshed in a century-long struggle with state-sponsored
cultural programmes, from “desinicization” at the early stage of colonial
rule, to “Japanization” at the subsequent stage, and to “re-sinicization”
under the KMT rule. Despite many inherent tensions and contradictions,
in the second half of the 20th century there was a clear trend towards a
growing aspiration for a separate Taiwanese identity in both cultural and
political terms.
At the end of the century, Taiwanese society is moving away from a
state-centric and state-dominant mode of state–society interaction. With
the installation of democratic institutions, society is now able to arrange
for political contest to gain control over public power and state apparatus.
With the stunning defeat of the KMT in the year 2000 presidential
election, the resiliency of Taiwan’s new democracy has passed its last
test. But the emerging consensus over national identity is by no means
consolidated. Into the next century, the people of Taiwan will continue to
wrestle with competing claims to their political allegiance and cultural
identity. The deepening of economic interdependence between Taiwan
and mainland China, the settlement of an increasingly larger number of
Taiwanese businessmen and migrants in the mainland,49 and the emerg-
ence of a Mandarin-based media industry across the Straits will certainly
complicate the consolidation of Taiwanese identity. Most fundamentally,
an elite-orchestrated Taiwanese nation-building project will inevitably
run into a head-on collision with a state-orchestrated Chinese nationalism
on the mainland, putting the security and well-being of the Taiwanese
people at grave risk.
49. According to the internal document of Mainland Affairs Council, it is estimated that
there are currently at least 200,000 Taiwanese expatriates living in China.
